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I. INTRODUCTION
Two of the principal goals of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act' were
to separate the administrative and judicial functions of bankruptcy judges
and to establish a strong administrative system to fill the void left by the
removal of bankruptcy judges from administrative and supervisory tasks.'
The United States trustee system was supposed to fill that void. The 1978
Act, however, provided only a framework for the role of the United States
trustees. Congress established policy and form, but not mechanics or
procedures for bankruptcy administration. Furthermore, Congress relied on
the Department of Justice and the United States trustee system to implement
the program in a manner that carried out Congress's policy of strong,
forceful administration and supervision. However, Congress failed to define
adequately a theoretical basis for, or a model of, bankruptcy administration
that would give guidance to those charged with implementing the program.
As a result, the nature of bankruptcy case administration and the interrelationships among the players and the process remains unclear. In addition,
the statute provides no policy guidance on the proper roles of the bankruptcy
judges and the United States Trustees.
This Article attempts to develop an appropriate model for bankruptcy
administration. In addition, it strives to refine the distinction between
"administrative" and "judicial" functions that precipitated the establishment
of the United States trustee system in the 1978 bankruptcy legislation. This
is not intended as an Article about how or why bankruptcy judges or United
States trustees (or both) are doing too much or too little in bankruptcy
administration, although in various districts either or both are. Nor is it
intended to propose a restructuring of either of those institutions or a
redefinition of their roles. Rather, it is a conceptual piece, designed to
explore the nature of decisions in bankruptcy cases-both liquidations and
reorganizations-as well as the appropriateness of the decision-making
institution and the decision-making process to the task at hand.
II. TOWARDS A MODEL OF BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION

A. The Nature and Function of a Model
A model of bankruptcy administration can provide structure and
functioning guidelines to the current system and can suggest ways to

1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., and in other titles)
[hereinafter "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code"].

2. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 107 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5965-66, 6068-69.
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improve it. A model also can provide concepts and context for a more
principled evaluation of particular proposals. A model cannot, however,
provide substantial guidance to those who practice under the current system.
It is a developmental tool most useful for evaluating reform proposals and
setting the direction for improvement.
In developing a model, one must identify and describe the functions to
be performed in administering a bankruptcy case, rather than merely
describe the institutions (such as the United States trustee or the court) that
will perform those functions. A model should describe the parties, and the
powers, duties and responsibilities inherent in a bankruptcy proceeding. In
addition, the model should describe the allocation of powers, duties and
responsibilities among the parties and articulate some principled reasons for
the allocation.
This Article uses the existing substantive bankruptcy law3 and the
existing bankruptcy court system as the context for the model. Neither the
terms of the substantive bankruptcy law, nor the manner of selecting judges,
their tenure, jurisdiction, or venue, nor the appellate structure for bankruptcy court decisions should affect the analysis or allocation of the administrative functions discussed in this Article.
B. The HistoricalModel
Historically, bankruptcy has been considered ajudicial proceeding. This
view seems more a result of the assignment of bankruptcy cases to the
courts for the adjudication of bankruptcy and for the supervision of case
administration from the earliest times5 rather than a result of anything
inherent in the nature of the process, or of any conscious decision based on
an analysis of the functions performed by the process. To the contrary, after
the declaration or adjudication of bankruptcy, the process appears to be one
more of administration than dispute resolution, despite the placement of the
function in the courts. Indeed, both the statutes and the courts have so
treated the bankruptcy process. Each bankruptcy statute authorizes courts of

3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-158, 1334 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
5. Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). Until the Act of March
2, 1867, ch. 176, § 11, 14 Stat. 517, 521, voluntary bankruptcy was not permitted.
When bankruptcy was commenced as an action against an absconding trader, a judicial
forum may have been the most appropriate.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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bankruptcy to appoint commissioners, 6 assignees, 7 registers, 8 trustees, 9
receivers, 10 and referees" to handle the actual administration of bankruptcy cases. The judge's role after adjudication has been more of a supervisory
role in reviewing the administration of the case. Disputes often arose in the
course of settling the affairs of a bankrupt. Therefore, it was convenient to
have the court (or its adjunct, the referee) at hand for summary resolution
of those disputes. Still, the case itself was more of an administrative process
of liquidating or reorganizing assets and reviewing claims than one of
adjudicating disputes. By its nature, the overall case was not a dispute
suitable for judicial resolution. 12
C. The Model Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act
The "separation of administrative and judicial functions currently
performed by bankruptcy judges" was one of the principal goals of the 1978
legislation. 3 The Bankruptcy Commission 4 identified the combination of
those functions as a problem facing the bankruptcy system as it existed in
the 1970s, 5 and Congress sought to solve that problem. The simple
manner in which the problem was stated, however, defined the simple model
for the solution. As a result, the solution failed to comprehend the

6. Act of April 4, 1800, § 2, 2 Stat. at 21-22.

7. Act of August 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 442-43; Act of March 2, 1867,
§ 13, 14 Stat. at 522.
8. Act of March 2, 1867, § 3, 14 Stat. at 518.
9. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, §§ 33, 47, 30 Stat. 544, 555, 557.
10. Id. § 2(5), 30 Stat. at 546.
11. Id. §§ 33, 38-39, 30 Stat. at 555-56.
12. Cf. In re Saco Local Devel. Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 443-45 (1st Cir. 1983)
(holding that the proper "judicial unit" for determining finality for purposes of appellate

jurisdiction is "the traditional 'proceeding' within the overall bankruptcy case, not the
overall case itself").

13. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 107, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6068-69.
14. Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States to study the bankruptcy laws and recommend to Congress proposals for reform.
Joint Resolution of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. The Commission's
report, REPORT

OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT],
was filed upon the completion of the Commission's work and formed the basis for the
hearings and debate that led to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. See H. R.
Rep. No. 595, supra note 2, at 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5963-64;
Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New BankruptcyLaw, 28 DEPAUL L. REv.

941, 943 (1979).
15. COMMISSION

REPORT,

supra note 14, pt. I, at 92-94.
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underlying nature of the functions involved.
The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act attempted to address the problem by
recharacterizing the proceeding and emphasizing its administrative nature.
It removed many of the bankruptcy courts' "administrative" responsibilities
and lodged them with the United States trustees.' 6 This administrative
structure established under the Reform Act was based on a simple model of
bankruptcy administration. It divided functions into two categories, judicial
and administrative, based solely on whether there was a dispute about a
particular issue. If a dispute existed, the matter was considered proper for
judicial attention and was directed to the bankruptcy court for decision. If
there was no dispute, then the court was not supposed to become involved, 7 regardless of the subject matter of the dispute or whether the
dispute was appropriate for judicial resolution."8
Nevertheless, long history and established practice created heavy
chains. 9 Thus, despite the apparently simple and absolute bifurcation of
functions, the Code requires or permits court involvement in certain matters,
either for historical reasons or because some matters were felt to be too
"important" to escape court supervision or intervention." ° The structuring,
filing, and processing of cases generally follows the historical model and
detracts from straight implementation of the simple reform model.2' For
example, petitions are still required to be filed in the bankruptcy court, thus
invoking the court process.' Conversion of cases from one chapter to
another is court-controlled- 3 Notices of proposed actions are filed with the
court, whether or not the action involves an actual or expected dispute at the
time the notice is given.24 The courts continue to maintain a complete case
16. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 100-101, 107, reprinted in 1978

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6061-63, 6068-69.
17. See generally H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 107-08, 315, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6068-70, 7272; Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31
andH.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civ. and Const. Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 586-87 (1975) [hereinafter House Hearings]
(statement of George M. Treister, Vice-Chairman, National Bankruptcy Conference)
18. In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506, 511 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (".
the decision calls for business not legal judgment.").
19. JohnD. Ayer, How to ThinkAbout BankruptcyEthics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355,
396 (1986).

20. House Hearings, supra note 17, pt. I, at 587 ("sensitive" matters).
21. Some of these features were imposed by the Bankruptcy Rules as they existed in

1978 and under the "Interim Rules" that were adopted as local rules and intended to
govern cases and proceedings until the rewriting and adoption of the new rules in 1983.
22. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302(a), 303(b), 304(a) (1988).

23. Id.
§§ 706, 1112, 1208, 1307.
24. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a) (providing that "the clerk, or some other person
as the court may direct" shall give notices); FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(f) (requiring an
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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file and require that all papers, including even those concerning only
administrative matters in which no dispute arises, be filed with the court.'
Furthermore, the courts and their clerks remain responsible for ensuring that
all necessary administrative steps in a case are completed before the case is
closed. In short, the paper flow continues to make the process appear
judicial, even where no disputes arise in the case.
As a result, many bankruptcy judges continue to view themselves as
responsible for the overall management and supervision of the cases on their
dockets. To some degree, the judges perceive the United States trustees as
merely assisting the courts in securing prompt administration of the cases.
Some judges may even perceive the United States trustees as irrelevant to
that responsibility. The judges often move to fill any vacuums in the
administration or management of the cases, because they continue to feel
responsible for the expeditious resolution of their cases.
In addition, many matters remain subject to court approval, even when
no dispute arises. For example, the assumption or rejection of executory
contracts and unexpired leases requires court approval.26 Such matters that
relate to the liquidation or reorganization of the estate, or its business, are
clearly administrative, even under the 1978 model; however, because the
rights of the other party to the contract or lease, and perhaps the overall
assets and liabilities of the estate, are implicated, the Code imposes the
requirement of court supervision. Approval of the employment of professionals, as well as their compensation, also remains with the court, whether
or not any matter is disputed."
Also, the courts must still approve Chapter 11 disclosure statements.
Even when all of the parties, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and the United States trustee approve a Chapter 11 disclosure
statement, the bankruptcy court must still determine whether it contains
"adequate information."2 8 Determining whether a disclosure statement
contains adequate information requires, at a minimum, a knowledge of the

accounting of sale to be filed with court).
25. See FED. R. Bankr. P. 5005(a).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a); see Arizona Appetito's Stores, Inc. v. Paradise Village Inv.
Co. (In re Arizona Appetito's Stores, Inc.), 893 F.2d 216, 219 (9th Cir. 1990); NLRB
v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526-27 (1984).
27. 11 U.S.C. §§ 326-331. Employment and compensation of professionals by the
estate had long been subject to criticism because of the apparent ability of professionals
to be paid when all other constituencies lose money. Employment and compensation are
clearly matters of the administration of the case itself; yet, Congress was not willing to
trust the United States trustee system to supervise this aspect of bankruptcy cases.
Therefore, the Code requires courts to review and approve all facets of the employment
and compensation of professionals.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b); See id. § 1125(a) (defining "adequate information").
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/9
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business as well as the Chapter 11 case, an understanding of the needs of
those receiving the information, and an appreciation of the terms and
implications of the reorganization plan and the matters that could derail the
plan.29 These matters require more than administration of the case. They
require active involvement in the Chapter 11 reorganization, or at least an
opportunity to investigate, rather than a role of merely resolving disputes.
Nevertheless, Congress determined that the disclosure statements are too
"important" to pass without court scrutiny. 0
Some of the most significant departures from the strict disputed/undisputed bifurcation model of the Bankruptcy Code occurred in
consumer bankruptcy. The original version of the Code required all
individual debtors to appear before the bankruptcy judge to "receive" the
discharge, hear a "warning" about reaffirmation of debts, and obtain
approval of any reaffirmation agreements, which were by their nature
undisputed.3 In exercising that duty, the bankruptcy judge acted as social
worker. In addition, Chapter 13 plan-confirmation hearings rarely involve
disputes; nevertheless, Congress requires a court hearing and confirmation
of Chapter 13 plans.32
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code's simple administrative model, which
bifurcated disputed (judicial) from nondisputed (administrative) matters, was
implemented imperfectly. Despite its simplicity, the model could have been

29. See Kirk v. Texaco, Inc., 82 B.R. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also In re The
Stanley Hotel, Inc., 13 B.R. 926 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (holding that disclosure
statement was sufficient because it gave creditors and interested parties enough
information to make a decision about whether to vote for a proposed plan, and because
enclosing all legal documents would have been impractical).
30. This view may have been premised on the practice under former Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1976) (repealed 1978). Former Chapter X
provided an exemption from the securities laws for the solicitation of the vote, id. § 664
(1976) (repealed 1978); see 11 U.S.C. § 1145 (1988), but required court approval of the
plan before it could be sent out for a vote. 11 U.S.C. §§ 574-576 (1976) (repealed
1978). Under Chapter X, the process of court approval began with the submission of the
plan to the SEC for an advisory report. 11 U.S.C. §§ 572-573 (1976) (repealed 1978).
Congress designed the Chapter 11 disclosure statement process to take the place of
these cumbersome protective features. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 227,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6186-87. However, Congress may have felt that
approval by a new and untested administrative agency (the United States trustee system)
without experience in the securities area would be inadequate, even though the Bankruptcy Commission proposed that the Bankruptcy Administration occupy the role of the
SEC in reorganization cases. COMMISSION REPORT supra note 14, pt. I, at 249.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d) (1982) (amended 1984). The current provision still
requires a hearing, a warning, and court approval if the debtor decides to reaffirm a
discharged debt. Id. § 524(c), (d) (1988).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1988).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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implemented strictly and consistently. Although any such implementation
would have improved the plan Congress actually enacted, the model still
would have been inadequate, primarily because it was incomplete. In
allocating responsibility in the system, the Code fails to acknowledge that,
in most of the kinds of matters described above, decisions are and must be
made even when there is no dispute. Moreover, the Code does not address
the nature of the decisions that must be made or the suitability of the
decision-maker to the particular kind of decision. Therefore, an additional
concept is needed to describe the kind of decisions being made and the
suitability of both the decision-maker and the decision-making process to the
decisions that must be made.
D. A Better Model of Judicial/AdministrativeBifurcation
1. Defining the Nature of the Decision
Any parent with more than one child is well schooled in the dual roles
of judicial and administrative decision-maker. The parent is all too familiar
with the difference between these two roles, illustrated by the following
examples. On the one hand, the parent assumes a judicial role when asking
and then deciding "what happened?" and "what are the consequences?"
following a sibling conflict. On the other hand, the parent acts a administrator when asking and deciding "what should we do today?" following
expressions of differing interests for the day's activities. Even though both
types of questions might be equally hotly disputed, the questions that are
asked and the solutions that are brought to bear are inherently different in
these two situations and require different kinds of information and skills.
Unlike ordinary civil or criminal litigation, which focuses almost solely
on "what happened?" and "what are the consequences?," bankruptcy cases
involve both judicial and administrative decisions. A bankruptcy case must
accomplish a complete settlement of all of the debtor's affairs and existing
legal relationships, many of which may involve disputes akin to ordinary
civil litigation.33 However, the case must also manage the business of the
estate, whether the business is liquidation or operation.
Thus, a concept that distinguishes between decisions based on past
events (who did what, when, how, and to whom?) and decisions based on
judgments about the future (what should be done?) might better describe the
kinds of decisions that must be made in the course of a bankruptcy case.
Such a concept can better define the distinction between the judicial and
administrative functions that the Bankruptcy Code sought to implement. This
concept is useful because it recognizes the differences in the kinds of

33. See H.R. REP. NO. 595, supra note 2, at 180, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 6140-41.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/9
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decisions to be made, the information they require, and the remedies that
must be fashioned. A more complete model of the bankruptcy system should
clearly defime this distinction and allocate responsibility based on these
factors.
2. ForensicDecisions
Decisions based on past events are the kinds of questions involved in
a typical, classic civil action. These decisions require proof of existing facts
and events that have already occurred and the application of governing law
to those facts. The decision-maker in a civil case decides "what happened?,"
determines the substantive rights of the parties to the action at a particular
time ("what are the consequences?"), and enforces those rights. The
outcome is often the award of money damages or the issuance of an order
requiring or prohibiting a party from taking some future action. While
fashioning a remedy in some instances may require looking into the future
to determine the likely effectiveness of the proposed remedy, the determination of the substantive rights of the parties seeking the decision generally
does not.34 These decisions will be referred to as "forensic decisions" in
this Article to avoid confusion with the common term "judicial decisions,"
which possesses too much independent meaning in the debate over
bankruptcy administration.
Forensic decisions typically arise from disputes about the facts or the
meaning or application of the relevant law (although disputes about remedies
may also arise). They are typically suitable for resolution by judicial forms
and procedures, such as the introduction of disputed evidence to permit the
court to find facts.3" Forensic disputes arise in bankruptcy cases over such
things as the allowabiity of claims, 36 the validity and priority of liens,37
entitlements to property of the estate (i.e., "who is the owner?"),"
exemptions, 39 discharge,4" and dischargeability.4" Indeed, the Bankruptcy
34. Although courts issue injunctions and other remedies that require court
supervision of prisons, schools, hospitals, and the like, that function differs from the role

of a bankruptcy court in supervising the administration of an estate. An injunction is
designed to protect a specific right and should go only so far as is necessary to protect
that right. 7 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

65.08, at 65-116

to -117 (2d ed. 1988) ("An injunctive decree does not create but only protects a
right ....

").

By contrast, the bankruptcy process is responsible for the entire

administration of the estate, including the operation of any business of the estate.

35. FED. R. Bankr. P. 7052 (incorporating FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), which requires
the court to make separate findings of fact and conclusions of law).

36. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988); FED. R. Bankr. P. 3007.
37. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-550; FED. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2).

38. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
39. Id. § 522; FED. R. Bankr. P. 4003.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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Rules require that adversary proceedings be brought to resolve all of these
kinds of disputes except disputes over claims and exemptions.42
3. Nonforensic Decisions
The other kind of decisions are those about the future. They require an
exercise of judgment as to the course of action that should be taken. The
decision-maker may rely heavily on historical facts and the existing
substantive rights of the parties in order to set the context for the decision.
Furthermore, the decision-maker may rely on historical events and past
performances to assist in evaluating the likely outcome of uncertain future
events. However, the critical bases for these decisions are primarily
predictions of future events (how will a decision one way or the other affect
the course of administration or obtain a desired result?). These decisions
require an evaluation of risks and a balancing of competing risk/reward
preferences among those involved in the case. Decisions of this kind relate
more to administration, either of the case or of an operating business, and
will be referred to in this Article as "nonforensic decisions."
In administering a case, the trustee must make a variety of nonforensic
decisions that are influenced very little by the past: What should be done to
preserve and protect assets? What procedure should be followed to dispose
of assets-private sale, auction, listing with a broker, or otherwise?4"
Which broker or auctioneer should be used? These decisions are common
elements of the liquidation of a Chapter 7 estate as well as the administration of an operating business. Often, a Chapter 11 trustee or debtor-in-possession will liquidate surplus or unprofitable assets that are not essential to
the reorganized business.' In addition, there are the daily operating decisions that management of any business must make and the less frequent decisions that boards of directors must make-whether to sell, retain, or
redeploy certain assets, whether to enter or terminate certain lines of
business, and so on.
Many of the daily, ordinary-course decisions are routine and made
without much thought. Many of the decisions out of the ordinary course are
also clear and easily reached without much controversy or debate. As the
40. 11 U.S.C. § 523; FED. R. Bankr. P. 4004.
41. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727; FED. R. Bankr. P. 4007.

42. FED. R. Bankr. P. 7001(1),(2),(4),(6),(8).
43. See FED. R. Bankr. P. 6004(f); Karbach Enters. v. Exennium, Inc. (In re
Exennium, Inc.), 23 B.R. 782, 788-89 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (finding that lower court

abused its discretion in not reopening a sale when trustee failed to apply to the court to
conduct a private sale), rev'd on other grounds, 715 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1983).
44. See, e.g., Committee of Equity See. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel
Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/9
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cases get bigger and more complex, however, decisions on many of these
issues can have serious implications for the values to be realized and the
time required for administration of the case.4" When these decisions may
have a significant effect on the amount that creditors or equity holders will
recover in the case, disputes can and do arise. Whether or not there is a
dispute, however, a decision must still be made by someone.
Moreover, even if there is a dispute, nonforensic decisions are fundamentally different from forensic decisions. Nonforensic decisions do not involve determining what the facts were at a particular time in the past and
applying the law to those facts to determine the rights and entitlements of
the parties. Rather, they involve the exercise of considered judgment,
typically business judgment, about a future course of action.46 As a result,
disputes over these decisions often involve disagreement about a prediction
of the future-events both within and beyond the control of the participants
in the administrative process-and about what constitutes an acceptable level
of risk and reward. The following three examples show how disagreement
about the future and about an acceptable level of risk and reward arises in
bankruptcy cases.
First, a trustee in a liquidation case may prefer a private sale or
retaining a broker instead of a public auction because the trustee believes
(i.e., predicts the future) that the private or brokered sale will avoid the
depressing effect on price that a bankruptcy auction often has.47 There is
clearly a risk that the trustee may be wrong and that the competition of an
auction sale may in fact bring more than a private sale. However, the
bankruptcy system relies on the trustee's experience and judgment to make
the decision as to how to proceed, as long as the trustee exercises reasonable
judgment. If a party in interest disagrees with the trustee's decision, which
kind of sale to hold is neither a question of "fact" nor a question of law.4"
Rather, it is a question of whether the trustee acted reasonably in balancing
the risks of the decision against the possible rewards.
Second, a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession might be willing to risk

45. See, e.g., id.; Institutional Creditors of Continental Airlines v. Continental
Airlines (In re Continental Airlines), 780 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Public Serv.
Co., 90 B.R. 575 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988).
46. See generally In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)
(holding that trustee's decision to use hay bailing instead of hay cubing was a business
decision within the trustee's discretion).
47. See generally, IRVING SULMEYER ET AL., COLLIER HANDBOOK FOR TRUSTEES
AND DEBTORS INPOSSSION
11.01-.02 (5th ed. 1991).
48. Whether the trustee is authorized to sell at a private sale, however, may be a
question of law. See Karbach Enters. v. Exennium, Inc. (In re Exennium, Inc.), 23 B.R.

782, 788-89 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (requiring public sale), rev'd on other grounds, 715
F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1983).
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estate funds on a particular venture in the hope of achieving a favorable
outcome.49 Without a favorable outcome, the debtor would likely recover
little or nothing in the Chapter 11 case. Thus, the debtor's interest in the
estate's current value is limited. By contrast, creditors may prefer to forego
the risk, preferring instead to take the available funds as a recovery rather
than venture them in the hope of increasing their recovery. Despite this
dispute, the evaluation still comes down to the accuracy of the risk/reward
evaluation and to risk preference, for which there is no external standard.
Third, a decision about whether to keep a Chapter 11 business operating may be based on the perceived ability of the debtor's management to
be effective and to accomplish the results that it projects. Undoubtedly,
management will have confidence in its own ability to succeed; however,
creditors may disagree. Any decision about whether to proceed must
evaluate the future likelihood of success-i.e., the risk of proceeding. This
evaluation will be based in part on management's past performance record,
whether anything has happened (again, in the past) that would reliably
predict (in the future) a change in the management's ability or the likelihood
of success, and the effect of such dynamic, uncertain, and unpredictable
external factors as markets, competition, and costs. The decision-maker
must balance the risks against the likely rewards to determine whether the
risks are worth taking.
There is no standard in the Bankruptcy Code, nor would it be easy to
create one, that could be applied in an adversarial setting to answer these
kinds of questions.5" Moreover, the solution may be a synthesis of various
nonlegal factors, such as devising means to reduce the risk or limit the
exposure of the estate if the venture is unsuccessful. These approaches

49. See, e.g., In re Simasko Prod. Co., 47 B.R. 444 (D. Colo. 1985) (allowing
debtor-in-possession to borrow money to fund oil drilling operations); In re BKW Sys.,

Inc., 69 B.R. 81 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987) (denying debtor-in-possession's motion to enter
into software distribution agreement, after evaluating relative risks and benefits); In re
Southern Biotech, Inc., 37 B.R. 318 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (allowing debtor-inpossession to purchase all outstanding shares of nondebtor corporation whose business
was essential to debtor's business).
50. In other areas where courts apply future-looking remedies, there are at least some
existing standards to apply. First, the court must find a violation of an existing statutory,
constitutional, or common-law rights. 7-Pt.2 MOORE, supra note 34,
65.0411]
("[Tihe ... court may, in the exercise of its discretion, properly grant an interlocutory
injunction when it is satisfied that there is a probable right and a probable danger and

that the right may be defeated. . . ."). Then, the court must fashion a remedy to protect
those rights. Although the court must predict the future in analyzing whether the
proposed remedy will protect the threatened rights, the rights themselves are a guide and

benchmark for what the court is trying to protect. There is no such fixed beacon in
bankruptcy administration. Instead, there is a wide range of solutions, all of which might

make business sense.
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require constructive business strategies. No amount of evidence can enable
the decision-maker to "find facts" 51 about the future. In fact, because the
objective facts are rarely in dispute, litigation over these matters often
involves the testimony of managers and consultants concerning why a
particular proposed course of action is likely to succeed or fail.
4. Disputed vs. Nondisputed Decisions
Many decisions in bankruptcy cases, both forensic52 and nonforensic,
simply do not involve disputes at all. In some situations, the parties are simply in agreement or have been brought to an agreement by a party with an
ability to influence others in the case. For many decisions, the amounts
involved are too small relative to the bankruptcy case, or the parties' investment in it, to warrant the necessary time and attention for a dispute. 3
Many decisions are undisputed simply because creditors or other parties with
potentially adverse interests have lost interest in the case. Once their debtor
is in bankruptcy, they would rather focus on more productive ventures than
attempt to supervise the debtor in the hopes of maximizing a meager
recovery.54 Often, creditors refrain from reviewing decisions because they
have confidence in the decision-maker (trustee or debtor-in-possession).
Thus, the identity of the initial decision-maker may heavily influence the
decision and whether it is challenged or disputed.
Not all decisions in bankruptcy cases can be neatly categorized as
forensic or nonforensic. The disputed-undisputed categorization is much
simpler and easier to apply. Nevertheless, bifurcating decision-making, as
the Bankruptcy Code does, based solely or primarily on whether the matter
is disputed or undisputed, without regard to whether the decision is forensic

51. See FED. R. Bankr. P. 7052 (making applicable in adversary proceedings FED.
R. Civ. P. 52, which provides "the court shall find the facts specially").
52. For example, the trustee may decide that a creditor's claim is allowable or may,

after some investigation, discussion, or negotiation, decide to reach an agreement with
the creditor over allowability. Because one of the trustee's duties is to review claims and
determine their allowability, 11 U.S.C. § 704(5) (1988), administration is not complete
until the trustee has, either by affirmative action or by acquiescence, decided how to treat
each filed claim. If the trustee decides to challenge the claim, a dispute will arise. Until
someone makes an authoritative decision on the trustee's challenge (either the creditor,
by acquiescing, or the court, by ruling), the case cannot be closed. See id. § 350(a).
53. See FED. R. Bankr. P. 6004(d) (allowing trustee to sell property worth less than

$2500 with more limited notice).
54. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, pt. I, at 98 (quoting COUNSEL TO THE
PETITIONERS IN THE MATTER OF INQUIRY INTO THE ADMINISTRATION OF BANKRUPT
ESTATES, 71ST CONG., 3D SESS., ADMINISTRATION OF BANKRUPT ESTATES, ix-x, 36-37

(Comm. Print 1931) (known as the "Donovan Report")).
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or nonforensic, does not address who is best qualified to make the initial
decision, to review the decision, or to supervise the decision-maker. The
disputed-undisputed bifurcation also fails to address what effect the nature
of the review has on the decision itself. Despite some overlap between
forensic and nonforensic decisions, most decisions should be predominantly
of one kind or the other. Thus, the forensic-nonforensic dichotomy can help
to determine the function of the decision-maker, assist in the development
of a model, and allocate tasks among bankruptcy officials.
However, categorizing decisions does not completc the model. A
bankruptcy case is not just forensic dispute resolution; it is a process. Each
activity in the process requires an authoritative decision. To return to the
parent/child example discussed above, each of the disputing siblings might
have decided "what shall we do today?"; but that decision is unlikely to get
them out the door and to the activity without the parent's authorization.
Thus, any participant in the process may make a decision, but that decision
will not affect the outcome of the process unless the decision is authoritative. The decision-maker must be invested with some authority under the
Bankruptcy Code so the decision either binds other parties or causes the process to advance in the direction dictated by the decision.
There are fully authoritative and partially authoritative decisions. A
fully authoritative decision is one that affects the progress of the case
without intervention by other decision-makers. For example, a trustee's
decision about where to deposit or invest estate funds or to sell an asset in
the ordinary course of business disposes of those matters. 55
A partially authoritative decision affects case progress in that it starts
a course of action, but is not fully authoritative because it requires the
approval of another decision-maker in the system who must be influenced
by the partially authoritative decision in making the fully authoritative
decision. For example, a trustee's decision to employ a professional at the
estate's expense or to assume or reject an executory contract must be
approved by the court before it becomes effective; but the court must give
56
deference to the trustee's decision under the business judgment rule. If
the fully authoritative decision-maker is not influenced by the partially

55. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 345(a), 363(c)(1).
56. See id. § 327; Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that district

court improperly substituted its own business judgment for that of the debtor, in allowing
debtor to reject an executory contract), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); In re Public
Serv. Co., 86 B.R. 7 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (acquiescing in New Hampshire debtor's
decision to retain counsel from California despite availability of less expensive local
attorneys); In re Heck's Inc., 83 B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1988) (holding that

lower court abused its discretion in denying motion of equity committee to hire counsel
of its choice).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/9
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authoritative decision, then the underlying decision is not partially authorita57
tive, because it has no effect on advancing the case or on its outcome.
E. Allocation of Decision-MakingResponsibility
Determining the nature of the decisions that must be and are made daily
in the bankruptcy system is only the first step. To develop the model further
requires an allocation of the responsibility for decision making and a brief
examination of the suitability of the decision-maker to the decision. The task
of allocating decision-making responsibility in the bankruptcy system is the
determination of who can make the first authoritative decision about a
particular matter.
Responsibility should be allocated, in part, based upon the effect the
allocation will have on advancing the progress of the case. That effect is
defined by the authority the decision will carry in the process. The critical
issue of the applicable standard of review to be used by higher (second or
third) level decision-makers in reviewing a first-level authoritative decision
both determines and is determined by how much authority is or should be
vested in the first-level decision-maker.
The forensic-nonforensic dichotomy can be used in allocating fully
authoritative decision-making responsibility, even though historical factors
that have established habit and usage might suggest otherwise. In a model,
however, history is less important than function. The allocation of
responsibilities in any system is based on the ability of institutions to carry
out their assigned duties. Thus, the model bifurcates decision-making
responsibility along forensic-nonforensic lines.
1. ForensicDecisions
Authoritative forensic decisions in bankruptcy cases are the kind of
decisions that are typically delegated to the court system, and they have long
been placed there. The responsibility for making authoritative forensic
decisions should be allocated, however, only when a dispute exists. A
trustee makes a nonauthoritative forensic decision by evaluating the facts and
the law and deciding what position to take on any particular forensic issue
in the case. When no dispute exists between the parties involved in that
issue, either all of the parties or none of the parties actually "make" the

57. One might suggest that the only fully authoritative decision-maker is the United
States Supreme Court because any decision can be carried upward to that body.
However, as used here, the concept is intended to encompass any decision that advances
the process, whether or not that decision might eventually be changed. For this purpose,
a decision is fully authoritative if it may or must be acted upon.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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decision. Instead, all of the parties agree on the operative facts, the
applicable law, the law's application to the facts, and the result."8
When there is a dispute, making a fully authoritative forensic decision
involves evaluating adverse parties' disputed views of the facts or the law.
A dispute typically involves an issue that is subject to judicial resolution,
such as the rights, entitlements, or liabilities of a party. The formal,
adversarial process is appropriate for this kind of fact finding and resolution
of disputed legal issues.5 9
Thus, for purposes of the model, authoritative decisions about disputed
forensic matters in bankruptcy cases should be made in the judicial system.
That is, when a disputed forensic decision must be made, one of the disputants should bring an action in court, where a judge having full authority to
resolve the dispute can resolve the issue, uninfluenced by the decision either
disputant made before bringing the issue to the court for resolution. These
decisions should be reviewed by ordinary appeals, as they are now.6
2. Nonforensic Decisions
Authoritative nonforensic decisions in bankruptcy cases are, by their
nature, more often made unilaterally. A decision about how to advance the
case is often made by the representative of the estate without any formal,
and often without even informal, consultation with other parties in the case,
and generally without any public notice or hearing. Because nonforensic
decisions are managerial, and because the disadvantages of "management by
committee" are well known, an efficient system could not be created
otherwise. Thus, someone has to be responsible for managing the case and
the estate's business and making the nonforensic decisions necessary to
move the process forward. The allocation of nonforensic decision-making
responsibility involves selecting an officer or institution to perform that
managerial job.
Historically, the allocation of managerial responsibilities has been
governed by a different policy choice, based on an unrelated principle. The
bankruptcy system adopted the concept of private, as opposed to governmental, control in conducting the business and management of bankruptcy
estates. 61 Private trustees administer both liquidations and reorganiza58. In a more commonly accepted sense, however, the decision is actually made only

when a dispute is authoritatively resolved, because the trustee's (or any litigant's)
"decision" is neither binding nor meaningful in advancing the process.

59. See FFD. R. Bankr. P. 7001-7082. These adversarial proceeding rules
incorporate many of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1988); FED. R. Bankr. P. 8001-8019.
61. H.R. RP. No. 595, supra, note 2, at 99-100, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N
at 6061; see Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank (In re Richmond Leasing Co.), 762
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/9
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tions, 62 and private management generally remains in possession and
control of a reorganizing company.63 The bankruptcy system has never
adopted the concept of governmentally employed trustees, receivers, or
business managers, nor is it likely to do so now.
There is no reason to change this principle or the resulting system for
purposes of the model. The principle is well ingrained, and there are
independent reasons for leaving it in place. For example, private control
promotes the use of reorganization law rather than threatening a reorganizing company's management and directors with immediate loss of control at
the commencement of the case.' Furthermore, such a system is consistent
with the general idea that most business failures are not caused by fraud,
dishonesty, or gross mismanagement, but rather by factors often beyond the
control of management.65 In liquidations, as well as reorganizations, the
system benefits from a general policy against the employment of governmental officers in matters adequately handled by the private sector. Thus, firstlevel nonforensic decisions have generally rested with the representative of
the estate (trustee or debtor-in-possession), 6 who is a private (nongovernmental) party. The model retains this approach.
F. Supervision of Estate Representatives
1. The Need for External Supervision
A system of checks and balances ensures that ordinary business people
and fiduciaries act with the interests of their businesses or trusts ahead of
their own personal interests. This system includes not only the criminal
laws, but also, perhaps more importantly, personal civil liability for
corporate officers and directors, partners, and trustees who violate duties,67
such as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 68 There is an implicit
assumption that such deterrents are necessary to prevent misconduct.
Some form of deterrent or a system of checks and balances is equally
necessary in regulating the conduct of decision-makers in the bankruptcy
system.69 There is reason to suspect, however, that the imposition of
F.2d 1303, 1311 (5th Cir. 1985).
62. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 1104 (1988).
63. See id. § 1107.
64. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 233-34, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6192-93.
65. Id. at 233, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6192-93.
66. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323(a), 1107(a).
67. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 205-06 (1959).
68. 2A WiLLIAm F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170 (4th ed. 1987) (duty of
loyalty); id. § 174 (duty of care); see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
'ne., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
69. See H.R. REP. No. 764, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1986), reprinted in 1986
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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personal liability as a deterrent does not work effectively in bankruptcy.
External supervision is not, however, essential to the bankruptcy
system. For example, if imposition of personal liability on bankruptcy
fiduciaries were effective, it would provide substantial incentives to proper
conduct. It does so effectively in the general law of fiduciaries. However,
the imposition of personal liability on fiduciaries might not be as effective
a deterrent to misconduct in bankruptcy cases. First, a bankruptcy fiduciary,
such as a debtor-in-possession, might not have anything further to lose by
the imposition of personal liability. While bankruptcy trustees are generally
not judgment-proof, officers of debtors-in-possession often are, especially
in smaller cases where the risk of malfeasance may run the highest. Second,
a system based on personal liability might put trustees at too great a risk of
being sued, even in the absence of actual wrong-doing or liability, so as to
discourage people from serving as trustees. Finally, it is the beneficiaries in
the nonbankruptcy context who typically bring actions to enforce the "rules"
against a fiduciary.7' In bankruptcy, however, the beneficiaries (creditors)
often feel that they have little to gain by such actions. They prefer to devote
their efforts to future business than to pursue a fiduciary who might have
invaded an estate that was probably worth too little to worry about anyway.
For the same reason, they will likely have difficulty obtaining counsel to
prosecute an action on a contingency-fee basis. Experience has shown that,
both inside and outside of bankruptcy, a fiduciary who is not answerable in
practical terms to the beneficiaries of his trust has too great an opportunity
for mischief, including lack of care and breach of trust. Accordingly,
bankruptcy has developed a system of direct external supervision of the
actions of trustees and debtors-in-possession, in addition to the ordinary
deterrents.
The model accepts the premise of the existing system of bankruptcy
administration that external supervision of nonforensic decisions is the best
way to deter misconduct and keep the bankruptcy fiduciary true to his trust.
The need for supervision is especially strong in business reorganizations,
because it is often a lack of strong business acumen on management's part
that caused the business to fail in the first place. To allow management to
continue unsupervised could easily invite the same problems to recur.
2. Governmental Supervision of Estate Representatives
External supervision can be governmental or private. Private supervision can be accomplished through general creditor supervision of the
activities of the estate's representative or through use of a private supervi-

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5227, 5231.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TRUSTS § 200.
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sor, such as a receiver. 7 Neither method is likely to be successful. At one
time, the law assumed that creditors would exert sufficient supervision and
control over estate administration to maintain honesty, care, and sound
business judgment. However, active creditor control has proven to be a
myth in all but a few of the largest bankruptcies or reorganizations. 72
Use of private supervisors (such as the receivership system under the
Bankruptcy Act) has the advantage of providing the incentive of compensation for good work. However, compensating private supervisors from estate
assets creates an equal incentive for misconduct, which in turn requires
supervision of the estate representative. Thus, private supervisors would
themselves need to be supervised, requiring the creation of a governmental
supervision system in any event. While a governmental system created to
monitor private supervisors would require less time and resources than one
created to supervise estate representatives directly, the multiple layering of
supervisory levels cannot be conducive to sound bankruptcy administration.
Finally, the benefits of bankruptcy and protection from creditors that create
the "trust" and the opportunity for breach of trust were created by the
government. Thus, although private administration of cases appears to be
appropriate, supervision of the private administration should be governmental.
3. The Governmental Supervisory Officer
The Bankruptcy Act vested courts with direct supervisory responsibility.' Under the Bankruptcy Code, courts retain some general supervisory
authority over undisputed nonforensic decisions,74 many administrative
functions, and some tools for taking charge of bankruptcy cases. Moreover,
bankruptcy judges, many of whom served as judges or lawyers under the
former regime, feel obligated to fill any voids in administrative supervision,
lest the bankruptcy system, especially operating Chapter 11 cases, run
amok. As a result, bankruptcy judges actually take an active role in the
administration and supervision of bankruptcy cases. There are at least four
reasons why using courts for supervision of these matters is not ideal.
First, courts are not designed to make decisions in the absence of a
dispute. Courts are designed by their very nature to resolve disputes. They
do not have independent investigatory arms. While they can and do conduct
independent legal research, they cannot and do not conduct independent

71. Receivers were common under the Bankruptcy Act. See Bankruptcy Act § 2a(3),

11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(3) (1976) (repealed 1978).
72. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 104.
73. Bankruptcy Act § 39a, 11 U.S.C. § 67(a) (1976) (repealed 1978).

74. See supratext accompanying notes 20-30.
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factual research. 5 Nonforensic decisions about the conduct of a bankruptcy
case or the operation of a business are heavily fact based. In making
decisions, courts must rely on factual presentations of the parties. The
adversary system assumes that the presentations before a court will be
sharpened by the underlying dispute and that a court will be able to distill
the facts from the contending positions and presentations. In the absence of
a dispute, courts are ill-equipped to become fully informed. There is no
check or balance on the information that is being presented to the court.
Moreover, the court does not have the machinery to go beyond what is
affirmatively presented, other than what the court can learn from questioning
the presenter directly. An individual judge or member of the judge's staff
might "leave" the courthouse to make inquiries; however, such conduct is
not judicial.76 Individuals who otherwise conduct themselves according to
judicial norms and procedures should not have to break from that model and
play an entirely different role.
Second, even when a dispute arises, the adversary system is not a
particularly satisfactory way to make, or supervise the making of, nonforensic decisions. The adversary system is, by nature, formal. The system
does not encourage the disputing parties to cooperate in developing solutions
to nonforensic problems. Also, the adversary system does not promote collegiality or the exchange of ideas in developing solutions. While the parties
may engage in such conduct in an effort to settle a matter, the judge in an
adversary system does not utilize such techniques in reaching decisions when
disputes are litigated rather than settled. Judges could hold conferences and
reach decisions the way business managers do, but nothing about a court
system suggests that such a role should be imposed on judges instead of on
those who regularly perform that role.
Third, courts have no particular expertise in the substance of nonforensic decisions, nor do they have the ability to become sufficiently
involved in the particular estate or business to make sensible decisions.
Nonforensic decisions require frequent contact with the issues involved,
often from a business person's or administrator's perspective. Judges cannot
sit in board rooms while decisions are being made, and they typically do not
have access to the wide array of management factors that bear on any
particular decision. At best, the judges get an adversarial presentation of the
highlights instead of the complete picture.

75. In re EWC, Inc., 138 B.R. 276, 280 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992) ("The
bankruptcy court has neither the obligation nor the resources to investigate the
truthfulness of the information supplied, or to seek out conflicts of interest not
disclosed.").
76. See FED. R. Bankr. P. 9003 (prohibiting ex parte communication between the
court and parties in interest).
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Bankruptcy Judge Ralph Mabey captured all of these reasons in his
seminal decision refusing to second-guess a trustee's decisions:
[D]isagreements over business policy are not amenable to judicial
resolution. The courtroom is not a board room.... While a court may

pass upon the legal effect of a business decision, (for example, whether
it violates the antitrust laws), this involves a process and the application
of criteria fundamentally different from those which produce the
decision in the first instance. In short, the decision calls for business not
legal judgment.77
Based on this reasoning, most courts approve transactions by a trustee
that involve "a business judgment made in good faith, upon a reasonable
basis, and within the scope of his authority under the Code."78 Judge
Mabey offered the following in explanation: "[S]o long as the trustee can
articulate reasons for his conduct (as disinct [sic] from a decision made arbitrarily or capriciously), the court will not inquire into the basis for those
reasons. " 79 Application of this standard may amount to no supervision at
all, but it may be the best the courts can do without becoming sufficiently
involved in the business itself to give them a proper background and feel for
the decisions they are charged with reviewing.
Finally, no legal standards exist to guide courts in making nonforensic
decisions. There is neither a fixed set of rights to protect nor a right or
wrong answer to the issues presented in a nonforensic decision.
If the court is not an appropriate or adequate supervisor for the
representative of the estate, then an alternative must be found. To be
effective, the supervisory function must be performed by an independent
official who is able to investigate facts on his own, rather than relying on
a formal presentation of facts and analysis by the representative of the
estate, who has no particular incentive to explain why a proposed course of
action might not be wise. The supervisory officer must be familiar with the
administration of the estate, including the operation of any business, in order
to have a context in which to evaluate decisions about proposed courses of
action. Also, the supervisory officer must be able to follow the bankruptcy
from beginning to end in order to understand and properly evaluate the
context in which decisions are being made. This Article will refer to this
proposed governmental supervisory official as the Administrative Officer.

77. In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506, 511 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
78. Id. at 513-14 (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 514 n.lla.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 44:963

4. Matters Subject to the Administrative Officer's Review
This model assumes private administration of cases and estates. Such
a system is more susceptible to breaches of the duties of care and loyalty
than is a governmentally administered system. 0 Therefore, there is a
greater need for "professional" supervision. As such, the Administrative
Officer should be authorized to supervise or review all nonforensic decisions
of the estate representative, with only minor exceptions. These decisions
involve not only the business decisions of liquidating and reorganizing
trustees or debtors-in-possession, but also decisions relating to the case
itself, such as the timing and extent of required notices, the "pace" of the
case, and virtually all other nonforensic decisions. The estate is susceptible
to loss from these types of decisions. If governmental supervision of these
activities is needed, the scope should not be severely restricted. There is no
reason to limit the Administrative Officer's review only to major decisions.
This system does not suggest, however, that the Administrative Officer
should be involved in the day-to-day administration of the estate or the
operation of a reorganizing business. The Administrative Officer should
realistically be able to monitor decisions in the ordinary course of administration of the estate or the operation of a business from regular reports,
periodic reviews, and assessments of the estate representative's ability. The
estate representative should be required to notify the Administrative Officer
in advance of decisions that do not arise in the ordinary course of business"' because, by definition, these decisions would not be anticipated.
Also, such decisions tend to involve larger transactions, larger commitments
of resources, and larger exposure of the estate.' Advance notification of
such decisions promotes adequate supervision and generally will not interfere with the estate's business because unusual transactions usually are
anticipated in advance.

80. See generallyIn re BKW Sys., Inc., 69 B.R. 81, 82 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987) ("As
long as there is a debtor-in-possession,. . . the court has no independent verification that
present management is not taking the course more favorable to itself and less favorable
to the creditor body in general.").

81. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1988) (requiring notice and a hearing before the
sale or use of property out of the ordinary course of business); id. § 364(b) (requiring

notice and a hearing before incurring debt out of the ordinary course of business).
82. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.),
853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that postpetition leases executed by the debtor
were within ordinary course of debtor's business and that estate was liable for
environmental cleanup costs necessitated by debtor's operating wood treatment facility
on leases premises).
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G. Review of Decisions
1. Standardof Review of the Estate Representative's Decisions
Because the model relies on private administration through trustees or
debtors-in-possession, the initial decisions for nonforensic matters should
remain with the private representatives. The Administrative Officer's role
should be limited to reviewing those decisions. Consequently, how much
discretion should the estate's private representative have in making
nonforensic decisions, and what standard of review should the Administrative Officer apply to these decisions?
One alternative is to give the Administrative Officer plenary authority
to overrule any decision made by a private trustee or debtor-in-possession.
This approach would give the Administrative Officer the power to substitute
his own judgment and discretion for that of the private representative. The
Administrative Officer would not necessarily exercise this authority in every
case. More than likely, the Administrative Officer would only overrule a
decision when he or she strongly disagreed with the trustee or debtor-inpossession.
This alternative has serious drawbacks. First, the parties would quickly
realize that the real authority lies with the Administrative Officer, not the
trustee or debtor-in-possession, thereby undercutting the trustee's ability to
conduct the business of the estate. Second, a system that is designed to
undercut the trustee's ability to act will not attract capable, independent
trustees with sound judgment. Admittedly, many estate representatives are
debtors-in-possession who have little or no qualifications for estate
administration other than having presided over a business failure. However,
to the extent that a debtor-in-possession is incapable of effectively performing that role, other remedies exist that are not so drastic as a system that
effectively removes decision-making authority from all trustees and debtorsin-possession.83 Third, such a system contravenes the policy of encouraging
debtors to seek rehabilitation early, rather than later, by imposing a loss-ofcontrol disincentive to fiing for relief under Chapter 11.' Fourth,
different Administrative Officers would undoubtedly exercise their authority
with varying degrees of involvement. Some would review all significant
decisions in detail and exercise their own authority with respect to all of
them, while others would give more latitude to the trustee or debtor-in-

83. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 324(a) (providing for the removal of a trustee "for
cause"); id. § 1104(a)(1) (allowing the appointment of a trustee, and ouster of the debtor
from possession, "for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross
mismanagement").
84. H.R. Rap. No. 595, supra note 2, at 233-34, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6193.
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possession. Also, the potential excitement of supervising a mega-case could
tempt an Administrative Officer to take over management of a large
company, while smaller cases could languish from lack of attention. A
system that has so much flexibility as to foster nonuniformity does not
constitute sound bankruptcy administration. Finally, a system in which the
Administrative Officer has full authority to make all decisions is not
significantly different from a governmentally administered bankruptcy
system, which was rejected for the reasons described above.'
Thus, the estate representative should be responsible for nonforensic
decisions, but also should be subject to some form of review by the
Administrative Officer in order to give some weight to the representative's
decision. The standard of review should be stringent enough to avert the
dangers of an unsupervised bankruptcy system-lack of adequate care and
breach of fiduciary duty; but the standard should not be so stringent as to
remove the decision-making authority from the estate representative.
A standard of review such as "abuse of discretion" would probably
provide far too much latitude to the estate representative. The standard of
"sound exercise of business judgment," however, should serve the stated
goals. First, a breach of trust would not constitute a sound exercise of business judgment.8 6 Second, sound exercise of business judgment would
require due care by the estate representative in the administration of the
estate and the operation of the business." Because sound business judgment
and due care nearly always encompass a wide variety of reasonable options
in any given situation, 8 the sound business judgment standard of review
would provide latitude to the estate representative to select from a range of
reasonable alternatives. The representative would not be overruled if the
decision were supportable. 9 This standard would provide the estate
representative the control and authority necessary for sound administration

85. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
86. See Guth v. Loft Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
87. See Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A.2d 320, 323-24 (Del. Ch. 1979) (holding that

refusal to consider better offer was a failure to act with due care).
88. In re Lifeguard Indus., 37 B.R. 3, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) ("It is not this

Court's responsibility to determine whether Lifeguard should increase its tolling
operations, change its product lines, increase its distributing activities, cut back its sales
force, or manufacture vinyl siding."); see Dennis J. Block & H. Adam Prussin, The
Business Judgment Rule and ShareholderDerivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus.
LAW. 27 (1981).

89. See Institutional Creditors of Continental Air Lines v. Continental Air Lines (In
re Continental Air Lines), 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[il]mplicit in § 363(b)
is the further requirement of justifying the proposed transaction") (citing In re Lionel
Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983)); In re Southern Biotech, Inc., 37 B.R. 318,
322 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) ("well articulated reasons supported by facts").
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/9
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of the estate, without permitting conduct outside of the bankruptcy system's
stated goals. This standard also has the additional benefit of being well
known in the bankruptcy field. Bankruptcy officials, as well as the courts,
have substantial experience in its application.'
The only significant exception to the business judgment standard should
be for notices. Parties other than the Administrative Officer should be
entitled to notice of events, including out-of-the-ordinary-course transactions, during the case. When an event does not involve a forensic decision
(i.e., when the event does not determine the rights between the estate and
one or more parties), the extent of notice is judgmental and is not likely
regulated by the same strict due process requirements that apply to forensic
decisions.91
Under the current system, the bankruptcy court's role in regulating notices of administrative matters relates to undisputed matters that involve only
the administration of the bankruptcy. 92 These matters are outside the
bankruptcy court's primary responsibility of resolving forensic disputes.
But decisions about notice should not be left to the estate representative,
because the purpose of notice is to permit scrutiny of the estate representative's activities. Thus, the estate representative might have a conflicting
interest, which could encourage unduly limited notice for decisions that
might be controversial.
In general, judgments about the extent of notice of nonforensic
decisions require an overall knowledge of the bankruptcy case and of the
business. The officer responsible for supervising the administration of the
estate should have a thorough understanding of who the parties are, what
their interests are, and whether they should receive notice of particular
administrative matters. In addition, the officer should be familiar with the
pace of the bankruptcy and the major business and estate administration
events, in order to determine the appropriate time for notice of a particular
matter.' For these reasons, the Administrative Officer should have full
authority to determine whether a proposed form of notice is adequate,
whether the notice period should be shortened, and who should receive the
notice. The estate representative should propose the appropriate scope and
extent of the notice, and the Administrative Officer should review the

90. See, e.g., Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A. (In re Richmond
Leasing Co.), 762 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1985).
91. But see Credit Alliance Corp. v. Dunning-Ray Ins. Agency, Inc. (In re Blumer),
66 B.R. 109 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (raising to a constitutional level the issue of notice
of unsecured creditors of a proposed secured borrowing under 11 U.S.C. § 364), aff'd
mem., 826 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1987).
92. FED. R. Bankr. P. 2002.

93. See FED. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c) (permitting reduction of time for notices of
certain matters "for cause shown").
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proposal without giving any particular weight to the estate representative's
recommendation. As long as all notice decisions by the Administrative
Officer are reviewable by the bankruptcy court, such decisions are best
made in the first instance by the Administrative Officer who possesses
detailed knowledge of the administration of the bankruptcy.
2. Review of the Administrative Officer's Decisions
The Administrative Officer's decisions should be reviewable by the
bankruptcy court. The level of review should meet the goals stated
above-that the Administrative Officer be primarily responsible for
administration and review of nonforensic decisions, and that the office play
a meaningful role, not a subservient role to the court, in the areas of its
responsibilities. 94 These goals suggest that the Administrative Officer's
decisions should be subject to review by the bankruptcy court under a
standard that grants the Officer substantial discretion. The bankruptcy court
should not second-guess the Officer's decisions any more than the Officer
should second-guess the estate representative's decisions. As discussed
above, courts and the adversary system are not adept at making initial
nonforensic decisions.95
A court could employ three different standards of review in analyzing
an Administrative Officer's decisions. First, the court might consider the
business judgment of the estate representative and apply the court's own
analysis of whether that decision constituted a sound exercise of business
judgment. Such an analysis would duplicate the Officer's analysis and would
give the estate representative a second chance to prove the soundness of his
decision. An estate representative who did not agree with the Officer's
evaluation could ask the court for a more favorable evaluation. Obviously,
such a system would undermine the Administrative Officer's work and
would render the initial decision ineffective. Furthermore, such a system
would not add credence or confidence to the Administrative Officer and
should be rejected for that reason alone.
Second, the court might apply a business judgment standard to the
Administrative Officer's decision rather than to the estate representative's
decision. Such a standard would give weight to the Officer's analysis and
would require the estate representative to meet a reasonably heavy burden
when trying to take action over the objection of the Administrative Officer.
This standard, however, would likely be difficult to apply. Because the
Administrative Officer acts as a supervisor and not as the prime decisionmaker for the estate, the Officer is more likely simply to disapprove

94. See supratext accompanying notes 80-82.
95. See supratext accompanying notes 75-79.
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proposed actions rather than propose alternatives. Consequently, the court
would not really have an Administrative Officer's business judgment to
evaluate. The court would have to evaluate the business judgment the
Officer exercised in evaluating the business judgment of the estate representative. Such a standard would not be easy to implement in practice and
should be rejected for that reason.
Finally, the court might consider whether the Administrative Officer
abused his discretion or applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the
nonforensic decision of the estate representative. This is a familiar standard,
especially in the bankruptcy appellate context,9 6 and its application is well
understood. This standard affords proper weight to both the Administrative
Officer's decisions and the estate representative's decisions. For example,
if the Administrative Officer substituted his own business judgment for that
of the estate representative on a particular matter, that would constitute
application of an incorrect legal standard and would be reversible.' Often
the court should be able to make such a determination, at least in part, by
evaluating the underlying decision of the estate representative and the nature
of the Administrative Officer's objection. To assist the court in deciding
what standard the Officer used in evaluating the estate representative's
decision, the Officer should be required to state why he objects to the
decision.
H. Form of Proceedings
Currently, many disagreements over nonforensic matters could be
resolved by negotiation among the parties. However, the Code and the
Bankruptcy Rules effectively require a court-based procedure, under which
notices of nonforensic matters are filed with the court whether or not they
are likely to be disputed. Objections to these matters are filed with the
court, even when the objector is the United States trustee. 98 Consequently,

96. See, e.g., Boddy v. United States Bankr. Court (In re Boddy), 950 F.2d 334 (6th

Cir. 1991) (holding that lower court applied improper standard in reviewing award of
attorneys' fees); Davis v. Columbia Constr. Co. (In re Davis), 936 F.2d 771 (4th Cir.
1991) (reviewing extension of time for filing proof of claim granted by lower court); In
re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1989) (reviewing appointment of a trustee
in a Chapter 11 case); Martin v. Kane (In re A & C Properties), 784 F.2d 1377 (9th

Cir.) (reviewing court approval of compromise agreement), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854
(1986); In re Chung King, Inc., 753 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1985) (reviewing approval of
sale).
97. See e.g., In re Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 841 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1988)
(stating that bankruptcy court's ruling would be upheld in the absence of error of law or
unless based upon clearly erroneous factual findings).
98. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(a) (allowing objections to approval of
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the court's process is set in motion, even when a dispute is and could be
resolved by negotiation. If the trustee, debtor-in-possession, or other
proponent of an action, the Administrative Officer, and other parties in
interest were to could consult with each other before a proposed administrative action they would often obviate any objections.
Therefore, the Administrative Officer's decision-making should be
informal and interactive with the estate representative and other interested
parties. The Administrative Officer should review or consult on proposed
transactions before a "proposal" or "objection" is finalized and formalized.
Also, parties other than the estate representative may wish to consult with
the Administrative Officer in analyzing or reviewing proposed transactions.
The judicial-like procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act, 99
designed primarily for proceedings before hearing officers or administrative
law judges to find facts and reach conclusions of law, are not appropriate
for the Administrative Officer's function and should not apply to decisions
made by the Administrative Officer in carrying out his supervisory
responsibilities.'" Ultimately, the bankruptcy court will resolve any
disputes in compliance with full judicial procedures that comport with the
requirements of due process.
When the Administrative Officer disapproves of proposed action by an
estate representative, he should be able to prevent such action by filing a
written notation of disapproval in the case file (with a copy mailed to the
estate representative), rather than by filing an objection with the court.. The
estate representative will have to meet a high standard, described above," 1
to overturn the Administrative Officer's recommendation in court. That
burden, coupled with prior informal consultation, will likely result in the
estate representative's acquiescing in the Administrative Officer's decision
or reaching an accommodation with the Officer before the matter ever gets
to court. Thus, the Administrative Officer should not need to initiate court
proceedings because, in many cases, the matter will not go that far.
When the estate representative disagrees with the Administrative
Officer's decision, the estate representative should seek affirmative authority
from the court to proceed. To obtain that authority, the estate representative
would have to demonstrate a sound basis for his nonforensic decision, and
that the Administrative Officer abused his discretion or applied an incorrect
legal standard. This procedure would have the additional benefits of
bolstering the credibility of the Administrative Officer and framing the

disclosure statements), 6004(b) (allowing objections to proposedsales), 6007(a) (allowing
objections to proposed abandonments of estate property).
99. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
100. See supratext accompanying notes 75-79.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
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dispute in a way that a court can address.
While this procedure could operate efficiently when the Administrative
Officer opposes the estate representative's action, it may be more difficult
to implement if the Administrative Officer is concerned that the estate
representative is not taking action that is required (for example, pursuing an
avoiding power cause of action or closing an unprofitable part of a
reorganizing business). Without some enforcement mechanism, the
Administrative Officer could not compel the estate representative to take
such an action. Some federal administrative agencies must invoke the jurisdiction of a court to enforce their "orders. " " Thus, the Administrative
Officer could not issue formal orders because such a procedure might
require application of the Administrative Procedures Act or some other form
of due process, at least if the orders were to be given presumptive validity
in a subsequent enforcement action. Therefore, an alternative is necessary
to prevent the Administrative Officer supervisory system from turning into
a formal administrative procedure that would be inconsistent with its
purpose.
Written notations in the Administrative Officer's case file could serve
a similar purpose in requiring actions as they could in preventing actions,
even without formal enforcement powers. If a case trustee regularly disregards such written notations or "recommendations" from the Administrative Officer without seeking court validation, the case trustee would not
likely continue to receive appointments. 3 A debtor-in-possession who
disregards such notations would likely find himself the subject of a motion
to appoint a trustee."
The nature of the Administrative Officer system, which promotes
informal consultation and communication prior to any "formal" objection to
an estate representative's actions, should result in similar consultation prior
to the Administrative Officer's attempting to require action by the estate
representative. Such consultation would provide the first line of defense for
the estate representative in contesting the Administrative Officer's objections
to his actions or inactions.
Trustees and debtors-in-possession could more formally protect
themselves by seeking bankruptcy court approval of any proposed inaction
that the Administrative Officer disputes in the same manner that the estate

102. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. 160(e) (1988). But
see NLRB v. Brooke Indus., 867 F.2d 434,435 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (characterizing this procedure as "antiquated").
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1988) (providing that the United States trustee
designates a member of the panel of private trustees to serve as interim trustee in Chapter
7 cases).
104. See supranote 83.
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representative would seek court authorization for actions to which the
Administrative Officer objects. The standard of review should be the
same-i.e., whether the estate representative exercised sound business
judgment in making the decision not to take the action that the Administrative Officer recommended in the file notation. The court's review of the
Administrative Officer's decision would also be the same-i. e., whether the
Administrative Officer abused his discretion or applied an incorrect legal
standard in recommending the proposed action.
The estate representative would not need to challenge immediately
every file notation that recommends action. The representative could await
an attempt by the Administrative Officer to use the representative's
disregard of the recommendation to remove the trustee or to replace the
debtor-in-possession with a trustee. The Administrative Officer would rely
on the file to support such a removal, and the estate representative could
then challenge the recommendation. If the recommendations were not
substantially justified under the proper standard of review, then the grounds
for removal would not exist.
Generally, however, the estate representative would first attempt resort
to informal consultation. In a system based on consultation and communication, it is unlikely that the Administrative Officer would arbitrarily impose
case-specific requirements without adequate investigation or inquiry. Nor is
a court likely to find grounds for removal if the estate representative fails
to follow recommendations made by the Administrative Officer without
inquiry or consultation. If the Administrative Officer makes a recommendation after consultation, the estate representative could then seek immediate
court review, rather than risking his position on the outcome of litigation
involving a whole series of disagreements during the case.
This proposal may be a cumbersome way to implement the principle
that the Administrative Officer should not issue "orders" to parties in a
bankruptcy case. While this proposal is more complex than is desirable, it
seems preferable to a system that permits such orders, but requires
compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act or other due process
procedures in making decisions about all the activities in a bankruptcy case.
The latter system would needlessly slow bankruptcy administration and
increase its cost without any corresponding benefit to the interested parties.
III. CONCLUSION
The nature of a model is to attempt to describe the ideal. Whether the
model suggested in this Article in fact describes an ideal administrative
system may well be open to question. Undoubtedly, a significant criticism
of this model will be that the existing administrative system, the United
States trustee system, is bureaucratic, inflexible, cumbersome, expensive,
and staffed by people whose competence is less than desirable. Another
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/9
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criticism will likely be that bankruptcy practitioners would never willingly
cede such authority to an Administrative Officer; it is, after all, the person
in the black robe who is really in charge. To these potential criticisms, I
offer the following response.
These criticisms are not of the model itself, as an ideal, but of
bankruptcy administration and of the feasibility of the model. To that extent,
the criticism is misdirected. If a model is worth developing to help examine
facets of bankruptcy administration as concepts, then this criticism should
have no place in the debate. The ability, integrity, and dedication of
personnel is the key to success in any system, whether in bankruptcy
administration, the bankruptcy courts, the Presidency, or the Congress. This
model assumes that persons equal to the task-both as administrators and as
practitioners-will administer it in the spirit in which it was designed.
The model is intended to provide flexibility rather than bureaucratic
rules that would stifle case administration with countless diverse facts and
challenges. It is intended to impose a structure that permits supervision of
bankruptcy cases, and of the bankruptcy system, by experienced individuals
with the tools and authority to become knowledgeable about the matters that
come before them, without reliance on the adversary system for education.
Whether well used or abused, the referee system under the Bankruptcy Act
empowered the referees adequately to supervise cases with flexibility and an
understanding of the underlying facts, even though that system also had
serious deficiencies. The referees' black robes and appearance of judicial
power may have increased their effective authority and may have made them
more palatable supervisors to lawyers, who would prefer to practice before
judges than before administrators. Nevertheless, something was lost in the
transition to the United States trustee system under the Bankruptcy Code.
Something other than an adversary system is necessary to replace it and to
protect the functioning of the bankruptcy system.
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